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Introduction
This Working Paper draws on nearly twenty years of 
research in several African countries, on the inter-related 
themes of food insecurity, seasonality, coping strategies, 
famine, formal and informal safety nets, and social protec-
tion. The paper has three objectives:
to document and synthesise evidence on the nature  •
and consequences of seasonality across rural Africa, 
highlighting the similarities and convergences across 
contexts;
to explore the various policy interventions that have  •
been implemented in response to seasonality, with 
particular reference to the emerging social protection 
agenda;
to argue that current approaches to social protection  •
are misconceived and inadequate for addressing the 
seasonal dimensions of rural vulnerability.
Seasonality and ‘coping’ in 
four African countries
Seasonality
Seasonality is an under-reported food and health crisis 
that impoverishes and kills Africans every year; only its 
severity and duration vary across households and over 
time. In rain-fed farming systems, where smallholders 
depend on a single rainy season for most of their staple 
food needs, the annual ‘hungry season’ or soudure can 
last from a few weeks to several months, depending on 
the extent of food production self-sufficiency achieved 
in a given year. The rhythm of rural life in much of Africa 
is entirely dictated by this inflexible seasonal calendar, 
but the relative success or failure of this way of life is 
determined by the unpredictable behaviour of the 
weather. The mechanism is straightforward, repetitive 
as the calendar, and relentless. Smallholders prepare their 
plots while waiting for the rains to start, then they plant 
their seeds, then they pray that the rains will be adequate 
and well distributed through the growing season, during 
which they weed and tend their fields while watching 
the skies. If the rains are well behaved, their harvest will 
be good – ideally, enough grain to fill the granary for the 
coming year – but if the rains are low or erratic, harvests 
will be poor and the subsequent hungry season will be 
long and hard – granaries will be depleted sooner and 
food prices will start rising earlier and more sharply.
Communities most vulnerable to seasonality are rural 
and derive their livelihoods predominantly from farming. 
They live off land which they typically do not own but 
have usufruct rights allocated by their community or the 
state. They cultivate food and other crops for subsistence 
and income. Their farming is ‘subsistence-oriented’ but 
they are not ‘subsistence’ farmers, both because they rely 
on diversified sources of income and because they do 
not achieve self-sufficiency in most years. They practise 
low-input, low-output agriculture – their farming is domi-
nated by the hoe or the plough rather than the tractor 
and the combine harvester, and their yields are low (typi-
cally one-third or less of the potential yield of their plots). 
Unpaid family labour dominates rather than hired labour. 
The level of commercialisation, as proxied by the propor-
tion of crop production that is marketed, is low. Their 
vulnerability derives from a number of sources, 
including:
their dependence on a single unreliable source of food  •
and income – rain-fed agriculture – in a context where 
rainfall, the most important input, is erratic and 
unpredictable;
the weakness of rural markets for food, assets and  •
employment;
inadequate roads, transport systems, telecommunica- •
tions and other rural infrastructure;
all of these are exacerbated by widespread poverty  •
from household to national levels, and seasonality is 
a mechanism that perpetuates poverty and retards 
efforts to escape from it.
Supply and price seasonality in grain and labour 
markets was well documented by the early 1980s 
(Seaman and Holt 1980; Chambers, et al. 1981). Grain 
prices in uni-modal rainfall systems with weak local 
markets are often extremely variable, reflecting the fact 
that the single farming season results in a highly skewed 
availability of locally produced grain in local markets at 
different times of year. This price variability is far from 
random. Agricultural production seasonality results in 
food price seasonality of a predictable kind. Grain prices 
are lowest immediately after the main annual harvest, 
when supplies are high and demand is low. When the 
rainy season begins some months later, prices of staple 
foods start to rise, peaking a month or so before the next 
harvest is due, then fall sharply as the new produce arrives 
in the market. In summary, grain prices are lowest around 
harvest time each year, and rise steadily through the dry 
season until the next harvest comes in.
Seasonality also creates a tension within self-provi-
sioning households between what Pierre Spitz (1980) 
labelled the “forces of retention” (the need to retain food 
for subsistence consumption) and the “forces of extrac-
tion” (the need to dispose of food production to meet 
non-food needs), which explains why deficit food 
producers with inadequate alternative sources of cash 
are forced into the seemingly irrational behaviour of 
selling some of their food production at harvest time for 
low prices, only to buy food back for consumption 
purposes later in the season, when prices are high. As 
we shall see, this tension also operates across households; 
as a stratifying mechanism that increases income 
inequalities.
The adverse consequences of seasonality on the well-
being of rural people living in the tropics have also been 
well understood for decades (Chambers, et al. 1981; Gill 
1991; Ulijaszek and Strickland 1993). Agricultural season-
ality arises from the production of only one (sometimes 
two) harvests each year, which has two implications for 
rural livelihoods: (1) annual household income depends 
crucially on the size of the harvest, and a single failed 
harvest can destitute a poor family with limited savings 
and assets; (2) families with undiversified livelihoods must 
survive from one harvest to the next on produce 
harvested only once or twice each year. A further compli-
cating factor is seasonality in health and nutrition: many 
killer diseases are concentrated in the rainy season (e.g. 
water-borne diseases), when hunger and under-nutrition 
have already compromised the body’s immune 
system.
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The causal linkages between seasonality and hunger 
were observed in northern Ghana by a British Provincial 
Commissioner as long ago as 1911. “No-one who has 
been stationed in FRA-FRA at the end of the dry season 
can fail to be struck with the food difficulty. At the end 
of every dry season there is a FOOD-SHORTAGE. … There 
is said to have been a famine in FRA-FRA fifteen or sixteen 
years ago, when children were sold for a calabash of corn 
or a goat” (Webster 1911: 5). In the late 1980s, when I 
conducted fieldwork in nearby Bawku district, the corre-
lation between rainfall, food prices and malnutrition 
remained just as evident. The main rainy season in 
northern Ghana is June through August (Figure 1a), 
which is also the hungry season when grain prices peak 
in local markets (Figure 1b) and under-nutrition rates 
follow (Figure 1c). Millet prices can be seen rising steadily 
from January through July, then collapsing as early 
harvesting starts. Child malnutrition rates in 1988 started 
rising in April, as if tracking food prices with a time-lag, 
and fell back slightly but remained high from August 
onwards – clearly, rises in malnutrition take longer to 
reverse than do rises in food prices.
These adverse consequences of agricultural season-
ality have not been consigned to history. In Malawi, for 
instance, the causal linkages between food prices and 
hunger persist. Maize prices and child malnutrition rates 
are both low during the post-harvest months (May 
through October), but then start rising together, peaking 
during the annual hungry season (January – February) 
before falling around the new harvest (March – April). 
Figure 2 illustrates this relationship, with admissions to 
one Nutrition Rehabilitation Unit (NRU) in central Malawi 
as a proxy for child malnutrition. Between October 2004 
and January 2005, maize prices doubled (from 20 Malawi 
Kwacha for a kilogram of maize to MK42/kg), but admis-
sions for severe acute malnutrition increased by a factor 
of 7 (from 9 to 70 children), falling back when maize prices 
started coming down around harvest time.
Seasonality is also gendered. A survey of farming 
households in four highland regions of Ethiopia found 
that 86% reported suffering a food shortage during 
2005/6, but this prevalence was higher among female-
headed (97%) than male-headed (81%) households 
(Devereux, et al., 2006b: 19). Disaggregating this indicator 
by month reveals that food insecurity is experienced most 
intensely during the mid-year months of June through 
August – the peak months of the main rainy season – and 
is least severe around the turn of the year, following the 
main annual harvest in October-November. Figure 3 also 
illustrates that female-headed households consistently 
reported higher levels of food shortage, peaking at 68% 
in July against 57% of male-headed households.
‘Coping’
“Africans do not starve, they ‘cope’” (Seaman, 1993: 27)
How smallholders respond to seasonality is best under-
stood through the literature on famine ’coping strategies’. 
Self-provisioning farmers live each year on a knife-edge 
between survival and disaster. If the rains are good then 
the harvest is likely to be good, grain supplies in local 
markets will be adequate throughout the year and prices 
will remain at affordable levels, though they will inevi-
tably rise during the hungry season. The family may not 
need to buy food at all, if the grain stored in the granary 
is adequate to feed them through to the next harvest. If 
some additional food is needed, assets such as livestock 
(preferably off-take rather than breeding stock) can be 
sold at reasonable prices to finance the purchase of 
adequate quantities of grain.
On the other hand, if the rains are inadequate in 
volume or distribution, the family’s harvest will be poor 
and grain production throughout the area will probably 
be below average. Grain supplies in local markets will 
Figure 1. Rainfall, grain prices and malnutrition in northern Ghana, 1988
 (a) Rainfall (b) Millet prices
(c) Malnutrition (d) Millet prices and malnutrition
Source: Devereux (1992)
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be scarce during the hungry season, when prices will 
rise to unusually high levels, reflecting this general short-
fall, peaking just when the family runs out of stored food 
and becomes market-dependent for grain. But their 
effective demand for food will be curtailed by falls in 
asset prices, including wage rates, induced by excess 
market supplies of livestock, labour and other assets. 
This terms of trade decline between asset values and 
food prices has been labelled a ‘price scissors movement’ 
by Jeremy Swift (Swift and Hamilton, 2001: 73) and as 
‘exchange entitlement decline’ by Amartya Sen (1981).
An example comes from fieldwork in northern Ghana, 
where the terms of trade between grain and livestock 
varied by a factor of over two in both directions, doubling 
and halving every few months. In January 1988, when 
livestock prices were at their annual peak and grain prices 
were just starting to rise, the exchange rate favoured 
livestock: an adult goat could be exchanged for 50kg of 
millet. By July, grain prices were peaking, livestock prices 
had collapsed and one goat could be sold for just 22kg 
of millet. After the harvest in November, millet prices 
were lowest and goats had appreciated by 40%, so a 
goat was once again worth 52kg of millet (see 
Figure4).
Failures of production force self-provisioning small-
holders into adopting various coping strategies, which 
can be categorised under four headings:
rationing consumption, by reducing portions or skip- •
ping meals, to protect household assets and future 
viability;
diversifying diets, by consuming unusual foods, espe- •
cially cheaper or ‘inferior’ foods;
acquiring food or cash, through selling livestock or  •
assets, finding casual employment, borrowing, and 
other income-generating activities;
reducing expenses, by cutting spending on non-food  •
items, withdrawing children from school, postponing 
ceremonies such as funerals, and so on.
Within each category, there are qualitative and quan-
titative distinctions in the type and severity of strategy 
Figure 2. Maize prices and NRU admissions in central Malawi, 2004/05
Source: Devereux, et al. (2006a: 62)
Figure 3. Self-reported food shortages in rural Ethiopia by month, 2005/06 [N=960]
Source: Devereux, et al. (2006b: 66)
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adopted (e.g. a loan can be taken interest-free from a 
friend, or at extortionate rates from a moneylender). 
Typically, all the strategies commonly adopted during a 
hungry season are also resorted to during a famine. At 
the community or regional level, the difference between 
seasonal hunger and famine is clear. A famine is a period 
of food deficit so prolonged and widespread that virtually 
all households, even the relatively wealthy, exhaust 
conventional ‘coping strategies’ and resort to ‘survival 
strategies’ which, if they fail, will be followed by severe 
acute malnutrition and death (elevated levels of excess 
mortality). By contrast, a predictable annual hungry 
season is something that households expect, plan for 
(by developing various insurance mechanisms) and, by 
and large, ‘cope with’, by adopting a variety of adaptive 
responses and coping mechanisms. These might include 
selling off surplus animals, mild rationing, and seasonal 
migration. But within the community, the behaviour of 
poor households during a hungry season might be remi-
niscent of distress behaviour observed during a famine. 
Poverty and market failure might restrict their ability to 
cope with food deficits to such an extent that they face 
real, severe hunger, not just mild rationing, and they 
might even migrate out of the area after selling off most 
of their physical assets at distress prices. In terms of its 
impact on such individuals and households, this behav-
iour is indistinguishable from responses to famine.
In other words, within rural communities, the distinc-
tion between a ‘hungry season’ and a ‘famine’ is deter-
mined by each household’s economic circumstances as 
much as by exogenous conditions (climatic, agricultural 
or market). Two smallholder households affected by a 
comparable food deficit, or two neighbouring house-
holds facing different levels of food deficit, will be at 
different stages on the coping strategies continuum, 
depending on their respective resources. A slightly severe 
hungry season might be sufficient to destitute a poor 
household, while a district-wide famine, far from threat-
ening the survival of a wealthy family, may provide oppor-
tunities for further wealth accumulation. Michael Watts 
reached a similar conclusion, arguing from fieldwork in 
northern Nigeria that coping sequences reflect increasing 
‘commitment’ and ‘irreversibility’. Only the poorest class 
of households in Watts’ survey resorted to desperation 
measures during a food shortage in 1973/74 – such as 
selling farmland, or migrating. A few rich households 
bought grain and sold livestock; but none sold labour 
(adopted by 94% of the poor), or assets (51% of the poor) 
(Watts 1983: 440). This fact – that the poor adopt 
responses to food deficits which differ qualitatively and 
not just quantitatively from those adopted by the rich 
– has important theoretical and policy implications.
Seasonal food crises
The empirical evidence on seasonality and coping strate-
gies presented in this section comes from fieldwork 
conducted or managed by the author in four countries 
– Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi and Namibia – between 1988 
and 2007. These studies included:
Ghana 1988/09: doctoral fieldwork on household  •
responses to a seasonal food crisis in a millet-farming 
district;
Namibia 1992/03: a national survey that enumerated  •
responses to the regional (southern African) drought 
by farmers and pastoralists;
Malawi 1999–2007: a survey of household responses  •
to an exchange rate devaluation in 1999; a survey of 
rural household efforts to survive the famine of 
2001/02; and evaluations of seasonal cash transfer 
programmes in 2006 and 2007;
Ethiopia 2006: an assessment of how farming families  •
in four highland regions survived the hungry 
season.
All four countries share common socio-economic and 
agro-ecological characteristics. This does not imply 
homogeneity across these contexts – there are profound 
differences between them – but nor does it make these 
case studies unique or atypical. Millions of rural African 
families remain exposed to the lethal vulnerabilities 
associated with seasonality that are discussed here – 
which in itself is an indictment of the failure of decades 
Figure 4. Grain / livestock terms of trade in northern Ghana, 1988
Source: Devereux (1992)
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of agricultural policies and rural development projects 
and programmes throughout Africa.
Ghana
Historically, seasonal food crises in northern Ghana were 
triggered by harvest failures following drought, flooding, 
locusts or armyworms. The worst famine of the twentieth 
century in this region occurred in 1946, and was triggered 
by heavy rains shortly after planting time, which resulted 
in a failed harvest and an extremely severe hungry season 
some months later. The Department of Agriculture 
recorded typical indicators of seasonal food crisis, 
including high food prices, distress sales of assets and a 
slump in asset prices. Local people migrated to southern 
Ghana and north, to Burkina Faso, in search of work or 
to barter their animals and other assets for food.
The next year of severe hunger in northern Ghana was 
1983, following a drought early in the 1982 farming 
season. Five years later, in 1988, a combination of drought 
and armyworm resulted in 67% of households in the 
worst affected district (Bawku) harvesting no millet or 
sorghum at all. The immediate impact on crop harvests 
and local food supplies was exacerbated by rapidly rising 
food prices in local markets some months later (as shown 
in Figure 1b) – a classic indicator of seasonal food 
crisis.
Poorer households, buying grain in small quantities 
late in the agricultural year, bore the brunt of these price 
rises in early 1989. Wealthier households with the capital 
and acumen bought bags of grain in bulk at lower 
average prices in the immediate post-harvest period, and 
stored them for later consumption or sale, in expectation 
of abnormal price rises. When they sold these bags they 
made large profits – a clear case of wealthy households 
exploiting the market dependence of poorer households 
in a situation of imperfect markets, and a classic illustra-
tion of the polarising impact of seasonality within 
affected communities, with resource transfers flowing 
from the poor to the rich.
Figure 5 displays the adoption rates for several coping 
strategies deployed by 110 households that were inter-
viewed several times during the 12 months between the 
1988 and 1989 harvests, disaggregated by richest and 
poorest wealth quartile. The overall sequence displays 
adherence to the principles of sequencing by their ‘irre-
versibility’ and ‘level of commitment’, as identified by 
Watts (1983). Strategies that do the least damage are 
adopted first, while strategies that have potentially 
devastating consequences for household livelihoods and 
future viability are deferred to last, after all other options 
have been exhausted.
Seasonality affects poorer households more severely 
than richer households, and seasonality is polarising at 
the community level. When coping strategies are aggre-
gated into categories, it becomes clear that the rich 
adopted fewer strategies than the poor. From a total of 
18 responses recorded in the northern Ghana sample, 
households in the poorest quartile adopted 14, while 
those in the richest quartile deployed 9. This does not 
imply that the rich had fewer options (on the contrary), 
but rather that:
Their strategies were more effective, or lucrative. A 
rich household might sell one cow to buy the millet his 
family needs. A poor farmer, not owning any cows, might 
have to sell several goats and fowls, go for casual labour, 
take on a high-interest loan, and mortgage her next 
groundnut crop to raise the same amount of cash for the 
same food needs.
The rich did not need to resort to some of the desperate 
measures that the poor adopted. The ranking of responses 
reflects increasing distress. Far fewer rich households 
than poor rationed food consumption, borrowed, mort-
gaged crops, or postponed debt payments, and no rich 
household migrated, ate seeds it had reserved for 
planting, or postponed a funeral.
So the rich generally have more options than the poor, 
but need to use fewer in practice. The wider diversity of 
their potential sources of food gives them greater flex-
ibility and efficiency in achieving consumption security 
a n d  a vo i d i n g  b o t h  s e a s o n a l  h u n g e r  a n d 
impoverishment.
The converse of impoverishment is accumulation, and 
food crises, far from being a ‘Malthusian leveller’, can 
accentuate inequality within affected communities. Food 
Figure 5. Household responses to food deficit in northern Ghana, 1988/09
 Source: Devereux (1992); n=110
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crises polarise communities by forcing poor households 
to reduce their productive base, by transferring their 
productive assets to wealthy households at undervalued 
prices. In Michael Watts’ Nigerian study, while poorer 
households were buying grain, borrowing cash, and 
selling their labour and land, many wealthier households 
were selling grain, lending cash, hiring labour and buying 
land. In northern Ghana in 1989, it was local wealthy 
households who bought up the land rights and other 
assets that the poor were reluctantly selling for grain. 
Some wealthy farmer-traders even put up iron roofing 
on their houses, oblivious to the hunger in neighbouring 
compounds. Watts (1983: 441) concluded that it would 
be incorrect to regard communities as moving en masse 
through cycles of accumulation and asset disposal from 
year to year: “rather, during a subsistence crisis epicycles 
of accumulation and decapitalization can occur simul-
taneously within a single community, intensifying extant 
patterns of differentiation and immiseration”.
Namibia
The rainy season in northern Namibia, which is also the 
crop farming season, runs from October to April. In 1992, 
southern Africa suffered a disastrous rainy season that 
triggered a major seasonal food crisis throughout the 
region. The cereals harvest in Namibia collapsed by 71%, 
from 114,000 tonnes in 1991 to 33,100 tonnes in 1992 
(EWFIU 1992).
Livestock owners suffered a double decline in their 
ability to access food through livestock sales. Firstly, 
animals died in large numbers, reducing their asset-
holdings. Income from livestock sales was further reduced 
by a dramatic ‘exchange entitlement decline’, as livestock 
prices collapsed due to the excess supply and deterio-
rating quality of animals brought to market. In the 
drought year of 1992, sales of cattle in eastern Namibia 
were close to 50% higher than in 1991, while sales of 
sheep and goats in southern Namibia were 27% higher 
(NDTF, 1992: 10). A small survey of livestock owners in 
eastern Namibia in 1992 found that household entitle-
ments to food derived from goats and sheep fell by 53% 
due to small-stock deaths alone, and by a further 21% 
due to livestock price declines and maize price rises. The 
total loss in terms of household entitlement to food 
derived from livestock averaged 69%, or more than two-
thirds (Devereux and Naeraa 1996).
The Government of Namibia launched a major Drought 
Relief Programme, which included a public works 
programme and free food aid distribution. Important 
government interventions for livestock owners were 
fodder and lick subsidies, which were introduced under 
the Drought Relief Programme with the intention of 
containing livestock mortality and maintaining herds at 
viable levels. Fully 60% of the value of all drought relief 
transfers during 1992/93 was in the form of fodder subsi-
dies (Devereux, et al., 1993). This policy, which was accom-
panied by a borehole drilling programme, was criticised 
by environmentalists for contributing to overgrazing and 
desertification of already marginal land. Household 
incomes were also supported by a livestock marketing 
subsidy, which apparently contradicted the fodder and 
lick subsidies by encouraging de-stocking. On the other 
hand, the combination of fodder subsidies for livestock 
plus food aid for drought-affected people was entirely 
consistent with the colonial administration’s standard 
response to droughts in ‘communal areas’ of Namibia in 
the 1970s and 1980s.
In any event, excess mortality was averted in Namibia 
in 1992, thanks to effective government intervention 
under the Drought Relief Programme, the existing system 
of social welfare transfers (especially the social pension), 
and the deployment of ‘coping’ and survival strategies 
by drought-affected individuals and households (Figure 
6). The effectiveness of the humanitarian response and 
the predictability of social transfers as a guaranteed 
source of income throughout the crisis period probably 
explains why the proportion of households adopting 
strategies such as rationing was lower than in food crises 
discussed elsewhere in this paper. However, the sequence 
of adoption (as proxied by their prevalence) is familiar: 
austerity measures (consumption rationing and cutbacks 
in spending) are preferred to measures that incur higher 
economic and social costs (borrowing, selling livestock, 
requesting assistance – ‘informal transfers’ – from relatives 
and friends), which in turn precede strategies that could 
have permanently damaging consequences for 
Figure 6. Coping mechanisms by smallholders in communal areas of Namibia, 1992
Source: Devereux, et al. (1993: 40)
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household viability and well-being (partial or whole 
household migration, selling key productive assets).
Malawi
Evidence on seasonality in rural Malawi comes from a 
‘normal’ year (1999), a ‘famine’ year (2001/02) and a ‘food 
crisis’ year (2005/06). In one participatory exercise, 99 
focus groups were asked to illustrate the trajectory of 
the food crisis of 2001/02, by allocating 100 stones to 
the 12 months between April 2001 and April 2002, indi-
cating the severity of the crisis from month to month. 
Figure 7 presents the results from one typical focus group 
in southern Malawi. This community identified a ‘false 
start’ to the famine, as an initial period of rising food 
insecurity in July and August 2001, due to consumption 
of the inadequate maize harvest, was temporarily allevi-
ated by a harvest of pigeon peas in September which 
substituted for maize porridge (‘nsima’, the staple diet). 
By December and January the food crisis was peaking 
and more damaging ‘coping strategies’ were adopted, 
including withdrawal of children from school and 
consumption of inferior foods. The arrival of ‘green maize’ 
in the fields in March provided the first relief from hunger 
for several months, and the famine was effectively over 
when a reasonable harvest was secured in April 2002.
This pattern of steadily increasing food stress between 
harvests is not unusual, even if Figure 7 illustrates a 
famine year rather than ‘normal’ seasonality. In fact, Figure 
7 is a very recognisable representation of seasonal food 
insecurity in rain-fed agriculture systems. Only the inten-
sity of the annual ‘hungry season’, and the range and 
severity of coping strategies adopted in an effort to 
survive it, vary between ‘normal’ years and ‘crisis’ years.
Table 1 summarises ‘coping strategies’ recorded in 
southern Malawi three years before the 2002 famine, 
during a relatively ‘normal’ hungry season. Table 1 reveals 
that one of the most important seasonal coping strate-
gies in rural Malawi is casual labour, known as ‘ganyu’. 
The income earned by, for instance, weeding other 
people’s fields helps to fill the ‘hunger gap’ before the 
next harvest with food or cash to buy food. But ganyu 
has some disdvantages. Firstly, working on other farmers’ 
land – ‘field ganyu’, the most common category – 
competes directly with own-farm production of food and 
non-food crops. Seasonality in rain-fed agriculture 
imposes inflexible demands in terms of the application 
of labour inputs at specific dates in the cropping calendar. 
Food deficit smallholders must allocate their (often 
scarce) labour resources between earning food for today 
Figure 7. Trajectory of food crisis in southern Malawi by month, 2001/02
 Apr Little food insecurity, because it was soon after harvest and 
most people were eating own produced food. May
 Jun Not many people were buying food yet.
 Jul People were finishing what they had harvested and the number 
of those without food started to increase. Aug
 Sep Food insecurity fell temporarily, because people were harvesting 
pigeon peas and cooking them for nsima. Oct
 Nov People were eating maize seeds purchased for planting.
 Dec Most people had no food to eat; children were absenting them-
selves from school because of hunger. Jan
 Feb People were pounding maize cobs to make nsima.
 Mar The crisis abated when people had green maize to eat.
 Apr Harvesting started and the famine was over.
 Source: Devereux et al. (2003)
Coping behaviour Percentage
Dietary adjustments
Shifted to cheap ‘relish’ (eg vegetables 
instead of meat)
93.3
Ate smaller portions to make food last 
longer
91.3
Reduced number of meals per day 91.3
Ate ‘inferior’ foods (eg cassava instead of 
maize)
89.4
Expenditure reduction
Bought less firewood or paraffin 82.7
Bought less fertiliser 32.7
Took children out of school 0
Cash generation
Went for more ganyu to earn cash or 
food
58.7
Used income from business to buy 
food
39.4
Sold livestock or poultry to buy food 15.4
Sold tobacco or vegetable crops to buy 
maize
12.0
Borrowed money to buy food 6.7
Sold household assets to buy food 5.8
Rented out land to get cash for food 3.8
Used savings to buy food 0
Informal transfers
Received help from relatives or friends 39.4
Sent household members to stay with 
other relatives
12.0
Asked for help but was refused 30.8
Source:  Devereux (1999: 40). Survey data, Zomba District, 
February 1999
Table 1. Household responses to food deficit in 
rural southern Malawi, 1999 (% of households; 
n=104)
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by working on a neighbour’s farm or growing food for 
tomorrow by weeding and tending their own fields. The 
former strategy inevitably leads to lower yields and 
further dependence on ganyu the following year. 
Secondly, ganyu is also stratifying and polarising, since 
it redistributes labour from poorer to richer households 
on unfavourable terms, thereby entrenching food inse-
curity in the former households while facilitating wealth 
accumulation in the latter. Thirdly, ganyu represents a 
failure of rural labour markets, since the demand for 
casual labour coincides with peak labour requirements 
on-farm, but is lowest during the post-harvest months 
when under-employment is highest. Other sources of 
employment that offered more generous rewards or were 
available at other times of year would compete less 
directly with own-farm production.
Figure 8 summarises the coping strategies that were 
reportedly adopted by Malawians during the 2001/02 
famine. Two indications that hunger in this year was 
worse than in 1999 are: (1) the higher levels of adoption 
recorded (eg households in 84% of communities sold or 
bartered assets in 2001/02, but only 6% of households 
sold assets for food in 1999); (2) some ‘extreme’ survival 
strategies are recorded in 2001/02 (e.g. ‘immoral behav-
iours’ – meaning stealing or transactional sex – begging 
and scavenging) that were not mentioned in 1999.
Households that sold or exchanged some of their 
assets for food were asked about the value (cash or cash 
equivalent) at which they sold or exchanged these assets, 
and for how much they could have sold the same assets 
in the year before the famine. For instance, one household 
reported selling a bicycle that would normally cost 
MK 800, for just MK 150. These responses were used to 
estimate the amount of money that each household lost 
(or gained) by liquidating their assets during the food 
crisis period. The findings indicated that an average loss 
of 53% in asset values was incurred, across the country 
and across all assets disposed of as “distress sales” – in 
effect, most of these assets were sold for half-price. This 
finding illustrates how the lack of integration of 
commodity markets over time and space can also act as 
an impoverishing mechanism during hungry seasons 
and famines.
Since the failure of the government and humanitarian 
actors to prevent a seasonal food crisis in 2001/02, 
seasonality has become recognised in planning humani-
tarian interventions in Malawi. Table 2 shows the Malawi 
Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) projection 
of numbers of food insecure Malawians, and their ‘missing 
food entitlements’, during the 2005/06 agricultural year, 
following a poor harvest in April 2005. The key feature 
of Table 2 is the steady increase in the proportion of the 
population declared to be ‘at risk’ and in need of emer-
gency assistance from season to season, starting from 
13.8% immediately after the harvest and peaking at 
almost half the population (5.5 million or 48%) during 
the ‘hungry season’ in early 2006 (see also Figure 9).
Ethiopia
Seasonality is pronounced in highland Ethiopia, although 
exact timings vary across regions. In famine-prone Wollo, 
the main rains fall in July and August each year, but land 
preparation begins in April or May and farming activities 
– planting, weeding, harvesting – continue until 
November. The post-harvest months are a time of 
under-employment on the farm, so men and whole fami-
lies often migrate for work elsewhere, mainly between 
February and June, when the new farming season begins 
in earnest. The ‘hungry season’ can last for 4-6 months 
in a bad year, but usually peaks between July and 
September. Confirming the relationship between season-
ality in hunger and health, malaria occurs in June and 
again in September/ October (Kelkilachew Ali and Million 
Tafesse, 1996).
The direct relationship between seasonality and rural 
poverty in Ethiopia was quantified in a panel survey of 
1,403 households undertaken three times in 1994 and 
1995. In the pre-harvest hungry season of 1994, the 
poverty headcount in this sample was measured at 34%, 
but it fell to 27% around harvest time and returned to 
35% in the 1995 pre-harvest round (Dercon and Krishnan 
1998). This sensitivity of the aggregate incidence of 
poverty to the time of year that the survey was conducted 
– let alone to harvest variability between years – reveals 
how problematic is any static measure of income or 
consumption poverty in any community dominated by 
seasonality.
Figure 8. Strategies employed by people to overcome the 2001/02 famine in Malawi
Source: Devereux et al. (2003: 52)
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More recently, a survey of 960 Productive Safety Net 
Programme (PSNP) beneficiaries in the four main high-
land regions asked respondents what ‘coping strategies’ 
they had adopted during the 2005/06 hungry season 
(see Figure 10). The ranking of strategies adopted follows 
a pattern that is familiar from the other surveys on house-
hold responses to drought and seasonality reported 
above. The most widely adopted strategies are those that 
have little cost to the household and are easily reversible, 
such as rationing food consumption – smaller portions, 
or cutting back temporarily from three meals to two 
meals per day. These are by far the most commonly 
reported strategies in our survey, being adopted by 
almost three-quarters of the sample, and more by PSNP 
beneficiaries than by non-beneficiary households. 
Although this indicator of hunger was higher in PSNP 
beneficiary households than in a control group of 
non-beneficiary households, suggesting accurate 
targeting, this also suggest that the PSNP provided only 
partial protection against hunger and rationing in 2005 
– the transfers were either too small or too 
unpredictable.
Conversely, strategies that involve high cost to the 
household – in terms of asset stripping, or lost future 
income, or loss of social status – tend to be adopted last, 
only after other responses to hunger have been 
exhausted. A classic case in point is selling land, which 
requires the farming household to give up its most basic 
and indispensable productive resource. In our survey, a 
small number of households were forced into selling or 
renting out farmland to survive the 2005/06 hungry 
season; 18 of these 20 households were PSNP benefici-
aries. Clearly, the PSNP did not entirely protect household 
assets against forced disposal or ‘distress sales’, presum-
ably because the size of the cash or food transfers was 
not adequate for these households to cover their food 
consumption deficits. It is important to emphasise that 
this was not a famine or food crisis year – these house-
holds were categorised as ‘chronically food insecure’ and 
were removed from the annual emergency appeal 
process – but a fairly typical ‘hungry season’ in rural 
Ethiopia.
Discussion
The sequencing of coping strategies reported here, from 
6 studies in 4 countries over 18 years, displays a remark-
able continuity that is consistent with other empirical 
studies and with general principles identified in the 
literature. Self-provisioning households facing produc-
tion deficits will typically adjust consumption first 
(rationing, inferior foods), then reduce non-essential 
spending and raise income to buy food (income-earning 
activities, livestock and asset sales), then adjust house-
hold composition (migration, sending children to stay 
with relatives), then incur social costs (postpone ceremo-
nies, borrow or beg from neighbours, offer sex for food 
or cash), and finally resort to desperation measures that 
compromise future viability (selling ploughs or land). 
The key principle underlying this sequencing is the 
protection of future household viability – economic as 
well as social.
Season Population affected %  o f  n a t i o n a l 
population
Missing food entitlement 
(MT)
April–June 1,571,600 13.8% 21,100
July–September 2,883,500 25.3% 46,400
October–December 3,993,300 35.0% 76,000
January–March 5,500,000 48.2% 335,400 
Source: Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (2005: 20)
Table 2. Seasonal progression of ‘missing food entitlements’, in Malawi, 2005/06
Figure 9. Seasonality in population with ‘missing food entitlements’, Malawi, 2005/06
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Social protection in Africa
The rapidly evolving social protection agenda is surpris-
ingly reticent on the subject of seasonality. ‘Surprisingly’ 
because, in the past, various policies and institutions were 
put in place specifically to address seasonality, while 
contemporary social protection policies are grounded 
in an analysis of vulnerability that is often nuanced and 
linked to appropriate interventions. Proponents of social 
protection highlight demographic risks such as ageing, 
and health risks such as HIV and AIDS, and they advocate 
for ‘predictable transfers’ to reduce these vulnerabilities, 
yet they seem less engaged with economic or livelihood 
risks such as agricultural seasonality.
One explanation might be that social protection has 
emerged out of three distinct but overlapping policy 
discourses, but it sits uncomfortably in relation to all 
three. The first discourse is welfarist. Social protection 
has been described as “social welfare for countries that 
can’t afford social welfare”. A minimum suite of social 
protection interventions would arguably include social 
pensions for older people, child support grants for young 
children in poor families, and disability grants for people 
with disabilities. These commonly agreed ‘vulnerable 
groups’ share a crucial characteristic: they are labour-
constrained and do not engage fully, if at all, in economic 
activity. Agricultural seasonality affects farmers who are 
physically active and fully engaged in economic activity, 
so perhaps they are not regarded as a priority category 
for social protection support.
The second discourse is humanitarian. When harvests 
fail and poor farmers with few assets face life-threatening 
food deficits, humanitarian relief is mobilised to cover 
the consumption gap until the next adequate harvest. 
But these emergency ‘safety net’ interventions are short-
term responses to transitory food insecurity. social 
protection focuses instead on providing long-term 
support in response to chronic poverty and chronic food 
insecurity. The distinction between social protection and 
humanitarian relief is drawn quite sharply in some clas-
sifications, though others see all forms of social transfers 
as falling under the social protection umbrella.
The third discourse relates to governance. Until the 
1980s, African governments administered a range of 
policies and institutions to deal with seasonality, including 
fertiliser and food price subsidies and grain reserve 
management. But agricultural parastatals and grain 
reserves were judged as inefficient or corrupt, and price 
subsidies were declared unaffordable and undermining 
of incentives for farmers and traders. Accordingly, the 
activities of parastatals were scaled down, strategic grain 
reserves were abolished or ‘commercialised’ (run on a 
cost-recovery basis), and input and output subsidies were 
phased out across Africa. As a result, poor market-de-
pendent smallholders were once again exposed to the 
full consequences of high fertiliser prices and food price 
seasonality, and governments had no policies or mecha-
nisms for addressing this, because the nature of the 
problem is not recognised and the only available solu-
tions are ‘projectised’. A social protection agenda that is 
dominated by social transfers does not address the struc-
tural vulnerabilities against which smallholders have very 
real needs for protection.
The evolution of social protection interventions with 
respect to agriculture can be summarised in three 
phases:
social protection pre-liberalisation: “parastatals and  •
subsidies”
social protection post-liberalisation: “safety nets with  •
holes”
the new social protection agenda: “cash transfers, cash  •
transfers and cash transfers”
We have shown how agricultural seasonality has rami-
fications for production, consumption, health and liveli-
hoods, and we have explored how affected households 
respond to these (mostly negative) impacts in Ghana, 
Namibia, Malawi and Ethiopia. This section examines 
formal responses to seasonality in Africa by governments, 
donors and NGOs. The discussion is organised around 
three dimensions of seasonality: agricultural production, 
rural labour markets, and food and asset markets.
Figure 10. Coping strategies in Ethiopia, 2005/06
Source: Devereux et al. (2006b: 20)
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Social protection responses to seasonality 
in agricultural production
Poor rural Africans suffer seasonal hunger, impoverishing 
‘coping strategies’, high levels of undernutrition and high 
infant and child mortality rates, all of which represent a 
failure of coping. There are two ways for public interven-
tions to address the ‘food gap’ in these households: either 
increase food production or returns to crop sales and 
off-farm activities, or bridge consumption deficits with 
food or cash transfers. The former strategy is self-evi-
dently preferable to the latter. For poor people who are 
economically active, social transfers should be imple-
mented only after all productivity-enhancing anti-pov-
erty interventions have been exhausted. Chronic poverty 
and food insecurity caused by low productivity are best 
addressed by interventions to raise returns to labour 
pre-emptively – ‘productivity-enhancing safety nets’ 
(Devereux 1999) – not by handouts of food or cash after 
harvests prove to be inadequate.
Ghana: from export bans to ‘Global 2000’
The British colonial administration of the Gold Coast 
frequently banned exports of cereals from the Northern 
Territories during the 1930s and 1940s, arguing that local 
farmers myopically sold too much of their produce after 
harvest and were caught short later in the dry season. 
During the 1946minor famine, a standard famine relief 
intervention was launched, with the administration 
purchasing food from surplus regions in southern Ghana 
and selling it at cost in the north, and banning exports 
of grain out of the affected districts.
Rains were very deficient during the first half of the 
year and excessive in August and September. 
Cereals had to be replanted in most areas. … A bad 
harvest in 1945, followed by the delayed harvest 
this year, produced famine conditions … The 
Government purchased 150 tons of maize in Ashanti 
and sold it at cost in the worst affected districts. 
Private enterprise imported over 4,600 tons of maize 
from Ashanti and the Colony. … Prices reached 
unprecedented levels … Live-stock prices slumped 
following a glut on the market. (Department of 
Agriculture 1947: 9).
There is no doubt that the ban on exports of grain 
from the Northern Territories was of assistance to 
the natives of North Mamprusi in keeping prices 
down; the control acted in the same way as a famine 
reserve scheme, but without the risks entailed in 
central ised storage.  (Mamprusi  Distr ic t 
Administration 1947: 8).
This attempt to reduce hunger by indirectly controlling 
price rises, while at the same time relying on private 
enterprise to provide needed grain, seems misguided. 
Even if effective, this would surely only have deterred 
traders who might otherwise have brought more supplies 
of cereals into the area in response to high prices. In 1948, 
once again, parts of the Northern Territories suffered 
heavy rains soon after planting time, followed by a prema-
ture end to the rains, with adverse consequences for 
cereals harvests. The Annual Report of the Department 
of Agriculture for the 1948-49 season refers to its usual 
policy of banning cereals exports.
The precarious level of production and inadequate 
reserves of the Northern Territories farmers have 
again been apparent this year when badly distrib-
uted rainfall has resulted in food shortage. There 
was adequate rainfall for planting, but a drought 
in June checked growth and rainfall ceased alto-
gether in September. Yields of guinea corn, millet 
and rice were all affected. The ban on export of grain 
southward was re-imposed in February, 1949. 
(Department of Agriculture 1949: 6).
The main formal response to post-independence 
seasonal food crises in Ghana, for instance in 1983 and 
1988, has been emergency food aid, targeted at desig-
nated ‘vulnerable groups’. In the 1980s, attention also 
turned to supporting food production. ‘Sasakawa Global 
2000’ was started by a wealthy Japanese philanthropist, 
with the objective of supporting poor self-provisioning 
farmers to achieve food production self-sufficiency. 
Global 2000 provided small farmers with inputs on a 
revolving loan basis – fertilisers and seeds were distrib-
uted at planting time, in return for which participating 
farmers repaid some produce after harvest. The project 
came to northern Ghana in 1985. At first, as is typical 
with untested initiatives, people were wary but by 1989, 
10,000 farmers in Upper East Region were participating 
in Global 2000, and most farmers in the region would 
have registered if the project’s resources could have 
accommodated them.
The popularity of Global 2000 in the Upper East Region 
can be explained in terms of two factors identified in the 
project’s 1988 Regional Annual Report – the acute 
shortage of land, which meant that food production 
could be increased only by intensification (Global 2000 
disseminated high-yielding varieties of sorghum and 
maize), and the cash constraints that farmers face because 
the farming season coincides with the ‘hungry season’.
In the Upper East Region, expansion of arable land 
to increase food production is next to nil. The only 
alternative is to increase yield per unit land area 
per farmer. This has been quite successful with the 
comparatively few farmers who have benefited 
from the programme. .... At planting time, usually 
referred to as ‘hunger’ season, the urgent need to 
purchase grain to feed the family conflicts with the 
cash for production i.e. purchase of inputs and 
hiring of labour. (Sasakawa Global 2000, 1989: 4).
The use of chemical fertilisers and improved seeds 
raised crop yields by 3 times or more. In 1987 the average 
sorghum yield in Global 2000 fields was 1.8 tons per 
hectare, while that of adjacent non-Global 2000 plots 
was estimated at about 0.5 tons. Higher yields plus the 
threat of exclusion from further inputs provided strong 
incentives to repay, and the loan recovery rate for the 
Upper East Region stood at an impressive 87% in 1988.
Although Global 2000 could be conceptualised as a 
‘productivity-enhancing safety net’ that promoted 
household food security and reduced the seasonal 
hunger gap, there were at least two reasons for scepti-
cism in the context of northern Ghana. Firstly, the 
Table 4: Proportion of rural households severely 
affected by different shocks and stresses, 2005 
to 2007
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imperative to recover in-kind repayments to finance the 
revolving fund led to a tendency to register better off, 
more productive farmers (in one district, extension 
officers lost some salary for every bag of produce they 
failed to collect) so the project had limited outreach to 
the poor. Secondly, when Global 2000 doubled the repay-
ment requirement from one 100kg bag of produce to 
two in 1989, because of higher fertiliser costs, many 
smaller farmers immediately dropped out, fearing that 
handing over two bags would leave them with too little 
millet and sorghum to feed their families.
Namibia: the ‘Swiss cheese’ solution
In semi-arid areas of Namibia during the drought of the 
early 1990s, a combination of fodder aid and a borehole 
drilling programme was initiated in an attempt to protect 
livestock – the main source of entitlement to food for 
both pastoralists and farmers with deficient harvests – 
against excess mortality. Though well-intentioned, this 
intervention was criticised by many as misguided. 
Environmentalists complained that drilling too many 
boreholes in moisture-stressed areas was over-exploiting 
the groundwater reserves, degrading the land around 
the boreholes and “turning Namibia into a Swiss cheese”. 
Proponents of a ‘disequilibrium dynamics’ view of pasto-
ralism – which argues that livestock herds adjust to erratic 
weather by reproducing, collapsing and rebuilding in 
regular cycles – would assert that interfering with this 
natural adaptation process by delivering fodder aid and 
boreholes is inappropriate and unsustainable.
Other approaches to social protection in such contexts 
that are more effective than either ‘fodder aid plus bore-
holes’ or emergency food aid could include: livestock 
de-stocking and re-stocking programmes, rangeland soil 
and water conservation measures and drought risk 
management.
Malawi: from ‘Starter Packs’ to ‘Targeted Inputs’
Seasonal food security in rural Malawi deteriorated after 
the structural adjustment reforms of the 1980s, which 
included a ‘Fertiliser Subsidy Removal Programme’, the 
scaling down of the social marketing functions of 
ADMARC (the Agricultural Development and Marketing 
Corporation) and repeated currency devaluations, all of 
which undermined smallholder access to fertiliser and 
other essential farm inputs. As productivity declined and 
seasonal hunger intensified, the government and donors 
turned their attention to efforts to restore access to 
inputs. Instead of revolving loans (the ‘Global 2000’ 
model) or subsidies (which were politically unacceptable 
among the donors in the 1990s, though a U-turn has 
recently been seen on this issue in Malawi and elsewhere), 
the donors opted to support the free distribution of 
agricultural inputs.
Free seeds and fertilisers have been given to farmers 
in Malawi almost every year since 1992, firstly as a reha-
bilitation intervention following the 1992 southern 
African drought, but later as a response to rapid fertiliser 
price inflation in the mid-1990s. In 1998 the Government 
of Malawi launched the ‘Starter Pack’ programme, which 
gave all 2.8 million farmers a package with enough ferti-
liser, maize and legume seeds to plant 0.1 hectares. The 
rationale for this initiative was that subsidising food 
production is more cost-effective and sustainable than 
subsidising food consumption with food aid or uncon-
ditional cash transfers. Starter Packs added 100-150 kg 
of maize to each farmer’s harvest, and up to 400,000 
tonnes to the national harvest (Levy 2005). At a time 
when the national maize deficit often exceeded 500,000 
tonnes per annum, the Starter Pack substantially 
narrowed the annual food gap, reducing commercial 
import requirements and appeals for emergency aid.
After 2000 the universal Starter Pack programme was 
scaled down by two-thirds, becoming the Targeted 
Inputs Programme (TIP) that was delivered to about one 
million poor smallholders. In 2001, the TIP added only 
3-4% to smallholder maize production, whereas the 
universal Starter Pack had added 16% in 1999. Many 
critics blamed the scaling down of the Starter Pack for 
exacerbating the food crisis of 2001/02, though it remains 
unclear whether the Starter Pack would have protected 
the national harvest against the weather shocks of the 
2001 agricultural season.
Other observers argue that the significance of the 
Starter Pack was more in terms of its impacts on food 
prices, and hence on access to food, than on food produc-
tion. As noted above, the price of maize is a crucial deter-
minant of food (in)security in Malawi, and Levy (2005) 
argues that the Starter Pack contributed to keeping maize 
prices relatively low, by reducing the market demand for 
maize from smallholders in the hungry season months, 
after their granaries are depleted. In 2001/02, however, 
the reduced food availability following weather shocks 
and the scaled down Targeted Inputs Programme precipi-
tated sharp rises in maize prices – from MK 10/kg in 
October 2001 to MK 44/kg five months later – and it was 
this that triggered the food crisis in early 2002.
Social protection responses to seasonality 
in rural labour markets
It is a curious paradox that employment creation 
programmes have a good name, but public works 
programmes do not. Public works can be introduced 
either as an emergency relief measure (as in Namibia in 
1992) or as a means of regularly transferring food or cash 
to poor farmers, through the regular self-targeted instru-
ment of seasonal labour-based employment projects. 
There have been many shifts in thinking and implemen-
tation of public works, not least in the form of payment 
– from food-for-work to cash-for-work and even inputs-
for-work – but the basic principle has remained the same. 
In rural Africa and Asia, public works programmes are 
initiated in response to the twin crises of under-produc-
tion and seasonal under-employment.
As an ‘employment-based safety net’, public works 
offer farmers an additional source of food or income for 
consumption smoothing purposes when their harvests 
are inadequate. The best known employment-based 
safety net is Maharashtra’s Employment Guarantee 
Scheme, which was recently expanded to all of rural India, 
under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act of 
2005, which gives every rural household the right to 100 
days of employment at the local average agricultural 
wage. A key principle is the guarantee of employment, 
which assures any household affected by a livelihood 
shock, such as drought, of access to an alternative source 
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of income. This has the immediate effect of smoothing 
food consumption through the period of shortage, and 
the long run effect of increasing moderate risk-taking 
behaviour by farmers. The counter-cyclical benefits are 
highly significant – one study found that income varia-
bility halved in villages where EGS employment was 
available compared to non-EGS villages (Ravallion 
1990).
Namibia
When the southern African drought struck Namibia in 
1991, policy-makers debated responding with cash trans-
fers and cash-for-work, acknowledging the success of 
the monthly social pension in ensuring access to food 
and other essentials for Namibia’s older citizens. The logic 
was that cash-based social pensions had attracted traders 
to even the remotest Namibian communities, so deliv-
ering emergency drought relief in the form of cash should 
be equally effective. In the end, however, fearing a public 
backlash if cases of starvation occurred that were attrib-
uted to lack of access to food, the government imported 
food and appealed for humanitarian food aid.
Food-for-work was initiated as one of two food transfer 
components of the national Drought Relief Programme, 
the other being a Vulnerable Groups Feeding programme 
(free food distribution to children under-five, pregnant 
and lactating women, people with disabilities, in drought-
affected areas). Food-for-work projects fell into two 
categories. Two-thirds were large-scale public works, 
employing 71 people each on average and creating social 
and physical infrastructure (water pipelines, teachers’ 
houses). The remaining one-third were income-gener-
ating activities, each employing just 22 people on average 
(vegetable gardens, brick-making), but most collapsed 
once food deliveries were terminated, usually after six 
months. This unsustainability suggests that food aid was 
the primary motivation for participants. Participation by 
women exceeded 50%, and surveys suggested that their 
self-confidence and skills had been enhanced.
In terms of coverage, food-for-work was less successful 
than the Vulnerable Groups feeding programme, which 
reached 220,000 of its 250,000 targeted beneficiaries 
(88% coverage), while only 27,000 out of 375,000 able-
bodied adults targeted for food-for-work actually partici-
pated (7% coverage) (Devereux 2001). Two underlying 
problems explain this poor performance: a failure to 
appreciate that food-for-work involves a complex 
employment creation programme, not simply a food 
distribution programme, and the mistaken belief that 
food-for-work could be used to pursue multiple goals 
– not only immediate drought relief, also sustainable 
long-term income generation in poor rural communities. 
Namibia being a large country with a dispersed popula-
tion and a well developed existing infrastructure meant 
that rural communities were too small to mobilise for 
large-scale employment; there were limited opportuni-
ties for labour-intensive public works such as roads, there 
were limited markets for products of food-for-work 
income-generating activities.
Malawi
In Malawi, public works has been used since the mid-1990s 
for a variety of purposes, including to deliver food aid 
during emergencies, to generate seasonal employment 
during the annual ‘hungry season’, to build or rehabilitate 
community assets and physical infrastructure, to provide 
income to women, and most recently to facilitate access 
to fertiliser and seeds through inputs-for-work. Well 
designed and implemented public works programmes 
have the potential simultaneously to smooth consump-
tion and raise household incomes, thereby achieving 
both livelihood protection and livelihood promotion 
outcomes. One of the main debates about social protec-
tion in Malawi has focused on appropriate payment 
modalities. This started with the familiar discussion 
around ‘cash versus food’, which debated the limitations 
of food-for-work (eg the potential dependency and disin-
centive effects) and the risks of cash-for-work (especially 
of fuelling price inflation in fragmented food markets), 
but it has since broadened to consider the merits of 
transferring fertiliser and seeds through employment-
based programmes (i.e. inputs for work).
When public works participants were asked to articu-
late their preferences (which isn’t done nearly enough 
in the design of social protection interventions) they 
expressed views which reflected the centrality of season-
ality in their livelihoods. “At various times of year, people 
are interested in receiving different forms of payment. 
Before harvest participants want maize and after harvest 
they are interested in other items, especially seeds and 
fertiliser” (Dil 1996: xv). Another survey asked cash-for-
work participants on the Malawi Social Action Fund 
(MASAF) what form of payment they would prefer, by 
season. The majority expressed a preference for payment 
in cash around harvest time, in agricultural inputs around 
planting time, and in food during the hungry season 
(Zgovu et al. 1998). ‘Inputs-for-work’ was therefore identi-
fied as an innovative way of achieving improvements in 
agricultural productivity, reversing the declining yields 
which are a major cause of deepening food insecurity 
and rising seasonal hunger in smallholder Malawian 
households. Subsequently, the concept was piloted and 
a large inputs-for-work programme was initiated and 
evaluated positively. The idea of a seasonally differenti-
ated payment schedule for rural public works projects, 
which would include options for participants to receive 
payment in the form of cash, food, or agricultural inputs 
at the relevant time of year, has not yet been piloted in 
Malawi, perhaps because this model is too administra-
tively complex.
Ethiopia
Every year millions of Ethiopians face an archetypical 
seasonal food crisis: subsistence-oriented smallholders 
in uni-modal rain-fed agriculture fail to produce a full 12 
months of food, and face a pre-harvest hungry season 
characterised by high food prices and limited, low-paid 
off-farm employment opportunities. For the worst 
affected households, a ‘hidden famine’ occurs every year, 
which is addressed by an annual food aid appeal for at 
least 4 million rural Ethiopians. The Productive Safety 
Net Programme (PSNP) was launched in 2005. It was 
conceptualised in response to a perception that the 
annual emergency food aid appeal was mis-classifying 
millions of smallholders as ‘transitorily food insecure’ 
when in fact they were ‘chronically food insecure’. The 
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concept of the PSNP was innovative: take these chroni-
cally food insecure people off the annual appeal process, 
give them predictable social transfers to cover the 4-6 
months ‘hunger gap’ every year, give these transfers in 
cash rather than food, complement these social transfers 
with ‘household extension packages’ to promote liveli-
hoods, and after 3-5 years these people should ‘graduate’ 
not just from the PSNP but also from emergency relief. 
Key features of the PSNP design and implementation 
include:
Labour requirement: The PSNP is essentially a labour- •
based programme; at least 85% of beneficiaries receive 
PSNP transfers through the Public Works component; 
only 10-15% of registered beneficiaries are eligible for 
Direct Support because they lack labour capacity and 
have no-one to work on their behalf. The Government 
of Ethiopia is determined to avoid dependency and 
believes that social welfare is unaffordable. The work 
requirement is not just a self-targeting mechanism, it 
targets the PSNP on the economically active, those 
who have potential to ‘graduate’ into self-sufficiency 
and independence from external assistance.
Cash not food: The government believes that Ethiopia’s  •
dependence on food aid undermines producer incen-
tives and the emergence of integrated markets in rural 
areas. Conversely, the evidence from cash transfer 
programmes suggests that ‘cash aid’ can stimulate 
investment in production and provide incentives to 
traders. The dependency effects of food aid have been 
challenged by recent empirical studies, but an assess-
ment of the use of PSNP cash transfers found that they 
were indeed used for a wide range of consumption 
and investment purposes.
Predictability: Available evidence suggests that  •
predictability of transfers is key to achieving sustain-
able impacts. One-off transfers (such as a bag of food 
aid) are treated as windfalls and often entirely 
consumed, but repeated transfers offer more oppor-
tunity for investment, asset accumulation and savings, 
and can facilitate access to credit. This was confirmed 
in studies of social pensions in South Africa and 
Namibia, and predictable cash transfers in Zambia.
Graduation: As noted, minimising and reversing  •
dependency is a central preoccupation of the 
Government of Ethiopia, and for this reason the PSNP 
is time-bound, and social transfers delivered through 
Public Works and Gratuitous Relief are complemented 
with extension packages that aim to raise household 
incomes as well as protect their livelihoods.
To date, the PSNP has under-delivered: implementa-
tion has not matched conceptualisation. Firstly, in its 
efforts to speed up graduation and spread the benefits 
more widely, the government pressed for evidence of 
graduation from initial monitoring and evaluation 
surveys, and unwisely rotated beneficiaries out of the 
programme after only one or two years, thereby 
expanding the coverage but reducing the impact. 
Secondly, delivery problems, including delayed and 
erratic payment have undermined the intended predict-
ability, again reducing the potential longer-term impacts. 
Finally, the ambition to move from food aid towards cash 
transfers was undermined by a shift by 1.8 million benefi-
ciaries away from cash and back to food, probably a 
consequence of the rising food prices which meant that 
the real value of the (fixed) cash transfer is steadily 
declining.
Social protection responses to seasonality 
in food and asset markets
Numerous interventions and instruments are available 
to policy-makers concerned to mitigate the effects of 
food price inflation following a disruption to food 
supplies, or to protect consumers against regular food 
price seasonality. These include ‘open market operations’ 
such as buffer stock management, and pricing policies 
such as food price subsidies or legislated price banding. 
Many governments have used parastatal marketing 
agencies to intervene in weak markets – buying grain 
after harvest when prices are low and supplies are high, 
storing for 6-8 months until prices start rising and market 
supplies are dwindling, then releasing this onto local 
markets at cost, to boost supplies and dampen prices. 
Examples come from Ghana and Malawi.
Ghana
The Ghana Food Distribution Corporation (GFDC) was a 
government parastatal with an explicit seasonal food 
security mandate: to protect poor people from profi-
teering food traders during the hungry season. The GFDC 
used to buy grain after harvest at low prices and sell it 
later at prices well below the prices prevailing in local 
markets in the dry season. A mark-up of 32% was added 
over the purchase price, to cover costs of storage and 
distribution (transport).
Due to the inconsistency in the rainfall pattern 
coupled with the devastating effect of the army-
worm on some of our crops this year, the Bawku 
Traditional Area is again likely to experience severe 
hunger. I therefore wish to seize this opportunity 
in appealing to the Honourable PNDC Regional 
Secretary to use his good offices in letting the Ghana 
Food Distribution Corporation to send sufficient 
stock of foodstuff to their depot in Bawku to sell at 
moderate prices to us in the lean season. (Paramount 
Chief Azoka, 1988).
In the 1988/89 season, the GFDC bought 46,000 bags 
of paddy rice in the Northern Region (the major rice-
producing region in Ghana) and 1,000 mini-bags of late 
millet and sorghum. GFDC trucks toured the north 
throughout the dry season, selling this rice, millet and 
sorghum directly to traders and to the public. The price 
of GFDC rice was C6,700 per bag throughout 1989, while 
the price of a bag of rice in Pusiga market started at C5,000 
in October 1988 and rose to C7,600 or C8,000 in July 
1989. The price of rice did not rise as high during 1989 
as expected. A GFDC official predicted in March that local 
prices would rise to C9,000 or C10,000 per bag in June 
or July, just before the early millet harvest. Then, he said, 
“women will be queuing up to buy”, because the GFDC 
price would remain fixed at C6,700 per bag. The rather 
small rice price rise in 1989 might have been a tribute, 
at least to some extent, to GFDC activities (Devereux 
1992).
Working Paper 011 www.future-agricultures.org15
Malawi
Malawi has operated a Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) for 
decades. In early 2001 the SGR was fully stocked with 
maize that was rotting following two bumper harvests. 
The IMF advised the Government of Malawi to sell off 
this stock (preferably by exporting it to avoid disincentive 
effects on local producers) and to replenish it to a lower 
level – reducing the SGR from 180,000 tonnes to 60,000 
tonnes. Unfortunately, because the harvest was poor in 
2001, the parastatal marketing agency (ADMARC) was 
unable to purchase maize locally, and the national grain 
reserve was depleted precisely when it was most needed. 
If the SGR had been properly managed as intended, it 
could have prevented the unprecedented maize price 
rises that were blamed for magnifying the food crisis in 
2001/02.
Another mechanism for controlling food prices is 
through legislated floor and ceiling prices, or by imple-
menting food price subsidies. Until the 1980s, many 
African governments implemented pan-seasonal and 
pan-territorial pricing policies – farmers received the 
same payment for their produce from marketing 
parastatals wherever they lived in the country, and 
consumers paid the same price for food at all times of 
year. These policies protected farmers from isolated 
regions against high transport costs (taking their produce 
to market), and protected consumers against the price 
seasonality that is characteristic of tropical countries with 
one or two harvests each year. Typically these policies 
required heavy subsidies to be paid by governments, 
but by the 1980s these subsidies were considered to be 
unaffordable, and were phased out under agricultural 
sector reform processes that aimed to remove the inter-
ventionist state and stimulate private traders to fulfil the 
roles that had been monopolised by marketing 
parastatals.
In Malawi the abolition of producer and consumer 
price subsidies was achieved over a period of time by 
gradually expanding the ‘price band’ between a floor 
price (below which food would not be purchased from 
farmers) and a ceiling price (above which consumers 
would not have to pay for food). Since these are often 
the same people – deficit producers are forced to sell 
some of their produce at low post-harvest prices to meet 
non-food expenses, and buy food back in the hungry-
season at high pre-harvest prices – the abolition of subsi-
dies reintroduced this source of household food 
insecurity, which was magnified in years when weather 
shocks reduced harvests, lengthening the hungry season 
and raising food prices to unaffordable levels. While 
parastatal operations might have been inefficient and 
price subsidies might have been unsustainable, the 
removal of these pillars of food security in Malawi exposed 
the rural poor to the most severe consequences of 
predictable seasonality and unpredictable weather 
shocks. More than a decade after the phasing out of price 
subsidies, traders have yet to fill the gap left by ADMARC 
in grain marketing, and deficit farmers and consumers 
are more food insecure than ever before.
Responses to recent seasonal food crises in Malawi 
have been dominated by food aid and, most recently, 
‘emergency cash transfers’. In 2005/06 and again in 
2006/07, the international NGO Concern Worldwide 
delivered cash transfers in response to localised crop 
failures in central Malawi. Unusually, recognising that 
the effectiveness of cash transfers would be compro-
mised by rising food prices, the value of the cash transfer 
was adjusted each month to reflect food price move-
ments in local markets, in order to maintain constant 
purchasing power in terms of food. In effect, Concern 
underwrote the price risk facing market-dependent 
consumers, which are normally borne by the poor and 
are a major determinant of seasonal hunger and under-
nutrition. The cash transfers did achieve their intended 
consumption smoothing effect. Baseline and monitoring 
surveys found that meals per day stabilised in beneficiary 
households but fell steadily throughout the hungry 
season in non-beneficiary households. The cash transfers 
also enabled beneficiaries to meet a wide range of 
non-food needs, including groceries, costs of milling 
maize, health and education services, debt repayment, 
investment in farming or small enterprises – even asset 
accumulation (eg purchasing small stock) rather than 
‘distress sales’ of assets for food.
Both these interventions were implemented for only 
4-5 months, from December through April, which is the 
annual ‘hungry season’, but this model has potential 
application as a seasonal social protection mechanism 
even in non-crisis ‘normal’ years. The scale of the interven-
tion would vary according to the severity of the season 
and the numbers of vulnerable households affected. 
Perhaps the crucial innovation is index-linking the 
transfer level to local market prices for maize, which 
protects rural households against high food prices during 
abnormally severe ‘hungry seasons’. The case for deliv-
ering this social assistance in cash rather than food is 
that cash should contribute over time to stabilising 
supplies and integrating markets – ultimately bringing 
food prices down – unlike food aid which discourages 
food producers and traders.
The need to address food price seasonality was recog-
nised by Malawi’s Famine Early Warning System, which 
reported in December 2005 that: “In normal years, farmers 
sell maize at harvest time when the price is low and buy 
back during the lean period when prices are high. In 
general, the price differential is about 50 to 100%. 
However, this year farmers sold maize at around MK 10/
kg and are buying it at about MK 30/kg, or three times 
the price” (FEWSNET 2005: 2). A similar argument was 
made following the famine of 2001/02, when a moderate 
food production shortfall was magnified by abnormally 
large maize price rises which followed. According to John 
Seaman, an expert witness to the UK Parliamentary 
Inquiry into ‘The Humanitarian Crisis in Southern Africa’, 
this unprecedented rise in maize prices was the main 
trigger factor: “if you had stabilized the price of maize in 
2001 in Malawi no crisis would have occurred” (IDC 
2003: EV67). Questions that logically arise are: (1 Are cash 
transfers the optimal response to food price rises? (2) Is 
there not a risk that providing cash transfers will only 
fuel price inflation? (3) Should social protection interven-
tions address symptoms (i.e. high food prices) or causes 
(i.e. market failures)?
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Conclusion
The argument of this paper is that the emerging social 
protection policy agenda needs to engage more directly 
with agricultural seasonality if it is to address this funda-
mental source of risk and vulnerability facing millions of 
Africans every year. More provocatively, this paper argues 
that the current focus and menu of the social protection 
agenda is neither addressing this issue nor offering the 
most appropriate set of instruments. Why is seasonal 
hunger allowed to persist? Where does the burden of 
responsibility lie for ameliorating seasonality? How can 
innovative new thinking on social protection be focused 
on tackling this vicious source of vulnerability? This paper 
concludes with a suggestion that (at least) five shifts in 
thinking and practice are needed.
Shift #1: From projectised handouts to institutiona‑
lised interventionism
Food aid or cash transfers compensate farmers for 
production and market failures, but this only addresses 
the symptoms of the problem (hunger, high food prices) 
rather than the causes. Before agricultural liberalisation 
declared parastatals and subsidies fiscally and politically 
unsustainable, governments habitually intervened in 
commodity markets to correct for market failures, 
through grain reserve management, fertiliser price subsi-
dies, food price banding, and so on. Now that the World 
Bank has recognised that African governments do, after 
all, have a valid role to play in economic management 
and the achievement of social goods such as food secu-
rity, the policy space is opening up to explore appropriate 
state-led interventionism, especially in contexts where 
markets are weak and livelihood risks are high. Even 
fertiliser subsidies are back on the agenda. But does this 
go far enough?
Shift #2: From predictable in theory to predictable 
in practice
We have recently witnessed a profound shift in policy 
thinking and practice, from treating every hungry season 
as an emergency requiring the mobilisation of public 
resources very year, to a recognition that predictable 
crises require predictable responses, and “multi-annual 
resources” are being mobilised for this purpose. Some 
interventions already recognise and practice this prin-
ciple – social pensions in southern African countries, and 
pilot social cash transfer schemes that deliver cash 
monthly to beneficiaries. But these are welfare 
programmes targeted at older people, children, people 
with disabilities, and people affected by HIV and AIDS. 
Farmers who are guaranteed to face a hungry season 
every year are not guaranteed to receive social assistance 
during these difficult months (though their chances 
improve if an emergency is declared). Even innovative 
interventions that are targeted at smallholders, such as 
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme, offer 
predictable seasonal transfers on paper, but not in 
implementation.
Shift #3: From ‘cash versus food’ to ‘cash + food’ to 
‘cash+’
The ‘cash versus food’ debate has become unnecessarily 
polarised and ideologised, a discourse that masquerades 
as a theoretical analysis of the merits of alternative social 
transfers, but is in reality a public display of the prejudices 
and vested interests of governments and donor agencies. 
Recent emergency interventions in Malawi have demon-
strated the merits of delivering food aid, ‘cash aid’, or a 
combination of food and cash, depending on the national 
food supply situation and the responsiveness of traders 
and markets. There is also a significant gender dimension 
that is in danger of being overlooked: when men and 
women are asked about their preferences for alternative 
social transfers, men invariably choose cash but women 
very often choose food.
Cash transfers are dizzyingly fashionable, and huge 
claims are being made for their impacts not only as a 
social protection mechanism but for reducing poverty, 
building markets, and generating economic growth. Cash 
transfers are great, but they should not be promoted to 
the neglect of basic public investments in agriculture, 
markets, infrastructure and social services. A radical critic 
might even assert that cash transfers are a fig-leaf to 
conceal decades of neglect of investment in African agri-
culture and African farmers, in roads, in education and 
health services. In a global capitalist world, smallholder 
agriculture has a designated role as an exploited producer 
of primary commodities for wealthy national and global 
elites. Welfarist interventions such as cash transfers do 
little more than sustain poor farmers in their impover-
ished and marginalised state, and have the added bonus 
of buying off resistance and quelling unrest – enlightened 
self-interest by those holding economic and political 
power. Less radically, a pragmatist might advocate for a 
“cash +” rather than a “cash only” strategy. Social transfers 
must be complemented by policies that promote and 
diversify rural livelihoods at the local level, and by activism 
on behalf of smallholders to redress the gross inequalities 
and injustices in international trade regimes at the global 
level.
Shift #4: From reactive handouts to pre‑emptive 
insurance
Instead of waiting for harvests and markets to fail and 
then delivering food or cash transfers to affected house-
holds, innovative mechanisms are needed to provide 
effective insurance against the annual hungry season or 
occasional seasonal food crises. Examples include: (1) 
guaranteed employment schemes, along the lines of the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme in 
India; (2) weather-based insurance, which pays out 
participating farmers according to rainfall deviations and 
has been piloted in Africa, south Asia and Latin America; 
(3) futures markets, which governments can use (as 
Malawi used the South African commodity exchange in 
2005) to ensure access to adequate grain supplies at all 
times, at reasonable prices.
Shift #5: From discretionary welfarism to guaranteed 
entitlements and enforceable claims
Consider Ethiopia’s EGS and India’s EGS. Both are public 
works programmes, both operate in rural areas where 
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livelihoods are dominated by self-provisioning small-
holders, both address seasonal crises of under-produc-
tion and under-employment. But Ethiopia’s EGS was 
ineffectual in tackling the impoverishing effects of 
seasonality in production, employment and food prices. 
Conversely, India’s EGS is credited with stabilising house-
hold consumption across seasons, encouraging moderate 
risk-taking by farmers and exerting upward pressure on 
rural wage rates – all pro-poor outcomes that enhance 
food security and reduce vulnerability to seasonal 
hunger.
So what’s the difference between Ethiopia’s 
Employment Generation Scheme and Maharashtra’s 
Employment Guarantee Scheme? The secret lies in the 
words ‘Generation’ and ‘Guarantee’. The Ethiopian 
programme was triggered by annual emergency appeals, 
and access to public works employment was contingent 
on donor responsiveness and government discretion 
about eligibility. The Maharashtra programme bestowed 
a right to employment that every citizen could claim if 
and when they need it. If employment is not provided 
within a specified time and distance from the applicant’s 
home, the state is legally obliged to deliver the food or 
cash unconditionally.
The difference between a discretionary intervention 
and an entitlement that citizens can claim from the state 
is not trivial; it is fundamental. It is the difference between 
life and death.
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